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Brett has 18 years experience in large-scale IP networking, optical networking, and network security and vulnerability assessments. Brett helped deploy and maintain the original MCI and Genuity IP backbones, and designed the first metropolitan IP-over-Gigibit Ethernet product for Metromedia Fiber Networks. Brett has spent the last few years performing custom network and vulnerability assessments, and consulting on information security issues for some of the largest healthcare, water, and power companies in the United States. Brett most recently worked for Internet Systems Consortium�s DNS Operations, Analysis, and Research Center (DNS OARC) doing macroscopic analysis of global DNS behavior.
Brett's currently works for UltraDNS as a product manager for UltraDNS's external services (such as Managed DNS, Sitebacker, Recursive DNS, etc).
Brett recent publications include a book titled "Extreme Exploits”, published by Mcgraw-Hill/ Osborne as well as a soon-to-be published book titled "The Secrets to Carrier-class Network Security" (CRC Press).
Everyone is probably well aware of the Kashpureff-style DNS cache- poisoning exploit (I'll call this "classic cache poisoning"). For reference, see the original US-CERT advisory prompted by this exploit. Vendors patched their code to appropriately scrub (validate) responses so that caches could not be poisoned. For the next 7-8 years, we didn't hear much about cache poisoning. However, there was still a vulnerability lurking in the code, directly related to cache poisoning. ...On April 7, 2005, the SANS ISC (not to be confused with Internet Systems Consortium) posted an update detailing how Microsoft Windows DNS servers were still being poisoned, even though the "Secure cache against pollution" option was set. The SANS ISC found that Windows DNS servers using BIND4 and BIND8 servers as forwarders were being poisoned. But how could this be? more»
