The debate surrounding digital sovereignty has gained momentum in recent years, particularly within BRICS nations, where governments seek to assert greater control over their digital ecosystems. Proponents of digital sovereignty often frame it as a necessary countermeasure against foreign technological dominance, positioning it as either a “positive” force- fostering local innovation and self-reliance- or a “negative” one- fueling authoritarian control and economic isolation.

This binary framing, however, is fundamentally flawed. It assumes that sovereignty over digital infrastructures can be harnessed selectively, that states can construct controlled yet open digital environments, retaining the benefits of global connectivity while insulating themselves from external risks. Yet, history offers little evidence that such a balanced sovereignty can be sustained. Instead, the pursuit of digital sovereignty, no matter how well-intentioned, invariably accelerates digital fragmentation- not just of the Internet, but of the very structures that enable a globalized digital economy.

This article critically engages with Digital Sovereignty in the BRICS Countries; How the Global South and Emerging Power Alliances Are Reshaping Digital Governance, as conceptualized by Min Jiang and Luca Belli, and challenges its underlying assumptions through the lens of George Herbert Mead’s social theory. Mead’s work on the self, society, and symbolic interaction provides a compelling critique of digital sovereignty, exposing it as an unsustainable paradox that ultimately undermines the very digital ecosystems it seeks to protect.

Digital Sovereignty Is a One-Way Street

Sovereignty, by definition, demands control, and control necessitates exclusion. While digital sovereignty may begin as an effort to protect national interests, it inevitably evolves into mechanisms of restriction, regulation, and centralization that create digital silos rather than innovation hubs.

China’s Great Firewall is often cited as an archetype for state-driven digital sovereignty, having fostered domestic tech giants like Tencent, Alibaba, and Bytedance. However, beyond the familiar concerns of information enclosures, heightened political control, and user isolation, a deeper contradiction emerges- one that mirrors patterns elsewhere. Russia’s RuNet experiment, initially framed as a cybersecurity initiative, has not only reinforced state-controlled information flows but has also entrenched corporate monopolization within its own digital sphere. Likewise, India’s data localization policies, while justified as pro-business and sovereignty-enhancing, have primarily strengthened corporate gatekeeping rather than true digital autonomy.

If we examine these cases through the lens of what the authors of Digital Sovereignty in the BRICS Countries term “Corporate Digital Sovereignty”, it becomes evident that the primary beneficiaries of these sovereignty measures are not the states themselves, but dominant domestic tech corporations. As Jiang and Belli highlight, corporate digital sovereignty underscores the disproportionate influence of private companies over global digital governance, where sovereignty simply reconfigures control rather than decentralizing power. Ultimately, the country of jurisdiction may change, but the structural dynamics of dominance remain the same- what shifts is not sovereignty itself, but who holds the keys to the walled gardens of digital life.

These examples reveal a clear trajectory: once a state asserts digital sovereignty, it enters a spiral where gatekeeping becomes the default. Whether under the guise of economic self-reliance, national security, or cultural preservation, digital sovereignty measures ultimately serve to restrict access, deepen state control, and erode cross-border interoperability. There is no such thing as a politically neutral, open yet sovereign, innovation-driven yet insulated digital ecosystem. The moment sovereignty is invoked, fragmentation follows.

Whose Internet? The Illusion of Digital Self-Determination

At the heart of digital sovereignty debates lies a question of power, authority, and democracy- but more precisely, the people. The will of the people, the public interest, and collective digital rights are frequently invoked in governance discussions, yet they remain deeply contested and shaped by shifting political and economic forces.

A fundamental oversight in digital sovereignty debates is the failure to ask: What do ordinary Internet users actually perceive as “the Internet”? Mead’s social theory provides a powerful framework to expose this blind spot.

For most users, the Internet is not an abstract, decentralized global network, nor is it the sovereign-controlled digital territory imagined by policymakers. Instead, it is synonymous with platforms- the digital spaces that structure interaction, shape identity formation, and mediate access to information. Meta, X, YouTube, and Google are not just service providers; they are the primary gateways to digital life, wielding immense influence over infrastructure, data flows, and public discourse.

Studies on Internet usage in emerging economies indicate that 91% of smartphone users rely on social media or messaging apps, illustrating the extent to which digital access is shaped by platform ecosystems rather than sovereign infrastructures¹. Similarly, global surveys show that platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube not only serve as primary news sources but also influence search behavior, often bypassing traditional search engines. This reinforces that, for most users, the Internet is structured around dominant platforms rather than state-controlled digital environments. These findings challenge the assumption that digital sovereignty can fundamentally reshape user behavior, as engagement remains dictated by transnational platform dynamics rather than national policies.

These findings reinforce the platform-centric nature of the modern Internet. Meta, X, YouTube, and Google are not merely service providers- they are gateways to digital life, controlling infrastructure, data flows, and public discourse. Even in China, where the state has enforced a sovereign digital ecosystem, the dominant user experience remains platform-driven. Baidu, WeChat, and Douyin serve as functional equivalents to Western platforms, demonstrating that even under rigid sovereignty, user behavior is still shaped by centralized digital spaces rather than by state-defined networks.

This reality challenges the very foundation of sovereignty-centric digital governance models. Mead’s concept of the generalized other- the collective set of norms, expectations, and social references that shape identity- demonstrates why digital sovereignty is inherently paradoxical. The Internet, like the self in Mead’s theory, cannot develop or sustain itself without continuous interaction and engagement with an external world.

Sovereign control over digital infrastructures might enable a nationally defined digital space, but it does not change the fact that users still conceptualize the Internet through platforms, not political borders. Sovereignty, in this sense, exists only on paper, while in practice, digital experience is determined by the structural dominance of platforms, whether global or domestic.

Digital Sovereignty as an Isolated Self: The Paradox of State-Controlled Platforms

If the Internet is analogous to Mead’s social self, then digital sovereignty represents an isolated self- one that falsely believes it can exist independently while still engaging with the external world on its own terms. This mirrors Mead’s critique of individualism:

• Just as no person can form a coherent self without participating in society, no nation can develop a meaningful digital ecosystem without engaging with global platforms and infrastructures.
• Sovereignty proponents assume that a state can selectively participate in the global Internet while controlling how its users interact within it- yet Mead’s theory suggests that this is an impossible contradiction. Digital identity, like social identity, is always relational, meaning that digital sovereignty, once fully asserted, risks creating a self-referential, stagnant, and disconnected space.

China provides an informative case study of this isolated self-paradox. While the country has achieved an independent, sovereign digital ecosystem, it has not changed the fundamental nature of how users experience the Internet. The Chinese digital experience still revolves around large platforms, just under a different regulatory structure. Rather than achieving true digital independence, China has simply replaced one monopolistic framework with another, mirroring the same power structures, centralization, and platform dependencies that exist in Western digital ecosystems.

The same paradox applies to other digital sovereignty initiatives- whether in Russia, India, or even BRICS-wide aspirations for a self-contained digital sphere. These efforts may create regulatory and infrastructural enclosures, but they do not alter the symbolic and functional role that platforms play in shaping users’ digital experiences. No matter how rigidly states enforce their vision of sovereignty, users will continue to conceptualize the Internet in terms of platform-based interactions, reinforcing an economic and infrastructural dependence that sovereignty alone cannot resolve.

The Inevitable Fragmentation of Digital Selfhood

If we extend Mead’s symbolic interactionism to the Internet as a social organism, then digital sovereignty can be seen as a process that dismantles the shared “generalized other” of cyberspace. This has profound consequences:

The global Internet has long operated as a shared symbolic system, where platforms, protocols, and governance models have maintained a degree of interoperability, allowing for fluid cross-border engagement. Digital sovereignty disrupts this by imposing localized frameworks, forcing users and states into increasingly fragmented digital realities. Instead of a collective digital space, sovereignty-driven policies create disjointed interpretations of the digital self, where access, norms, and public discourse are dictated by national constraints rather than globally shared standards. This erosion of interoperability does not merely restructure governance but fundamentally alters the symbolic and social fabric of the Internet, rendering global engagement more inconsistent, politically constrained, and inward-looking.

Mead’s theory highlights how identity formation depends on reflexivity- the ability to see oneself through the perspective of others. A fragmented digital ecosystem undermines this essential mechanism of adaptation, as states and users become increasingly locked into isolated, self-referential spaces. Just as an individual deprived of social interaction loses the ability to evolve, a sovereign-controlled digital space risks stagnation, reduced innovation, and a gradual loss of relevance in the broader digital order. The very notion of a sovereign digital self is illusory, as no state can fully control its digital ecosystem while engaging with external systems on its own terms. Mead’s critique of self-contained autonomy reveals sovereignty as a contradiction in motion- an illusion that can only be sustained for so long before it collapses under the weight of its own isolation.

Conclusion: Sovereignty Without the Social Is a Dead End

From a Meadian perspective, digital sovereignty is not just a technical governance model, but a fundamental crisis of digital selfhood. The attempt to assert a sovereign digital identity mirrors the myth of the self-made individual- the belief that one can exist independently while still participating in a larger social system. Just as Mead debunks this myth in human development, we must debunk it in the digital sphere:

• The Internet, like the social self, is relational, interactive, and dependent on external validation.
• Sovereignty attempts to carve out an independent identity, yet ultimately reinforces a reliance on the very infrastructures and platforms it seeks to escape.
• The harder a state pushes for digital independence, the more it isolates itself, losing access to the symbolic and technical ecosystems that make meaningful participation possible.

The Digital Sovereignty in the BRICS Countries framing of “good” vs. “bad” digital sovereignty misses the point entirely. The issue is not whether sovereignty can be used responsibly or abusively- it is that sovereignty, by its very logic, undermines the very conditions that sustain digital society.

The Internet, like human society, thrives on interaction, shared meaning, and dynamic exchange. When states impose rigid digital sovereignty measures, they are not just fragmenting infrastructure-they are eroding the very foundations of digital selfhood. And in doing so, they are setting themselves up for an irreversible collapse into obsolescence.

Digital sovereignty is not the solution to global tech dominance- it is an accelerant to fragmentation, a force that, left unchecked, will dissolve the Internet’s shared symbolic order into a collection of isolated, disconnected, and self-defeating dots. Taken together, the Internet cannot be sovereign any more than the self can be entirely self-made. To isolate is to disintegrate. And as Mead reminds us, the self- and by extension, the Internet- only exists through the social.